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Magistrates and Felony Voir Dire: A
Threat to Fundamental Fairness?
by
RAYMOND P. BOLANOS*

The expanding role of federal magistrates within the federal district

courts has received considerable attention, and commentators i continue
to debate the constitutionality of vesting the "judicial power" in the

hands of judicial officers "unprotected" by the salary and tenure provi-

sions of article III of the United States Constitution. 2 Appellate courts
generally have accepted the constitutionality of expanded magistrate adjudication since the initial Federal Magistrates Act of 1968. 3 Attempting

to meet the demands of an overwhelming federal docket, district courts
continue to utilize magistrates in less traditional adjunct capacities. At
least eleven federal circuits have upheld the increased allocation to magistrates of "inherently judicial tasks" 4 previously assumed to be reserved
for article III judges under the judicial power, including the entrance of

B.A. 1986, University of California, Los Angeles; Member, Third Year Class.
1. See, eg., Aug, The MagistrateAct of 1979: From a Magistrate'sPerspective, 49 U.
CIN. L. REv. 363 (1980); Streepy, The Developing Role of the Magistratein the FederalCourts,
29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 81 (1980); Note, FederalMagistrates andthe PrinciplesofArticle III, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1947 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Principles];Note, The ExpandingInfluence of
the FederalMagistrate, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 465 (1981) (authored by Thomas J. Platt)
[hereinafter Note, ExpandingInfluence]; Note, MagistrateTrialh"The New Hierarchyof Class
2 Adjuncts and Article III Judges, 58 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 559 (1984) (authored by Eric M.
Wagner) [hereinafter Note, Hierarchy]; Note, The Boundaries of Article II: Delegation of
Final DecisionmakingAuthority to Magistrates, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 1032 (1985) (authored by
J. Anthony Downs) [hereinafter Note, Boundaries];Note, Article III Constraintsand the ExpandingCivil Jurisdictionof FederalMagistrates:A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023 (1979)
(authored by Reinier H. Kraakman); Comment, Is the FederalMagistrateAct Constitutional
After Northern Pipeline?, 1985 ARIz.ST. L.J. 189 (authored by Leslie K. McMullin) [hereinafter Comment, After Northern Pipeline].
2. U.S. CONST. art, III, § 1 provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time establish. The Judges
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
3. Pub. L. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108-1114 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639
(Supp. 1988)).
4. United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1331 (2d Cir. 1988).
*
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final judgments upon pretrial consent of both parties.5 Despite this overwhelming acceptance of expanded magistrate functions, the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Ford6 recently held that a magistrate could not preside
over felony trial jury selection within the confines of the Federal Magistrates Act.
The debate over the constitutionality of magistrate adjudication focuses on the separation of powers. In theory, magistrates threaten the
separation of powers in two ways. First, article III ensures that an independent federal judiciary exercises the "judicial power" by providing
for life tenured judges with irreducible salaries. Because magistrates do
not have these protections, magistrate adjudication may threaten the independence of the judiciary and thus the separation of powers. Second,
and more specifically, because Congress created the office of the magistrate, the independence of the judiciary is threatened by congressionally
controlled officers exercising federal judicial power. The constitutional
approach that purports to protect the separation of powers through a
strict article III interpretation and an imposition of limits on magistrate
adjudication is no longer tenable, however. An examination of federal
court decisions discussing the constitutionality of magistrate adjudication
shows that the expansion of magistrate adjudicative powers does not
threaten the separation of powers. Rather, an analysis of these decisions
reveals that protecting the individual litigant's right to an article III
judge is the predominant policy behind limiting magistrate referrals. The
cases further reveal that, beyond concern for individual due process,
there lies a greater concern for systemic due process, or fundamental fairness. The courts' analysis implicitly places due process concerns at the
core of the discussions regarding magistrate adjudication.
This Note contests the continued validity of the traditional article
III analysis that questions the expanded use of magistrates. Although
the increase in magistrate adjudication does not threaten the separation
of powers, any non-article III exercise of the judicial power does suggest
the potential for denial of individual due process and erosion of the federal trial system's reliability through the breakdown of fundamental fairness. A due process approach to the determination of magistrate
5. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1518, 1519 (11th Cir. 1987); Gairola v.
Virginia, 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753
F.2d 1029, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d
890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir.
1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1314-16 (8th
Cir. 1984) (en banc); Puryear v. Edes's Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins v.
Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 114-20 (2d Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 34-36 (1st

Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc., v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 54445 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (PacemakerII); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922,
924-30 (2d Cir. 1983).
6. 824 F.2d 1430, 1435-38 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 741 (1987).
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constitutionality and the elimination of unimplicated separation of powers concerns would clear the confusion in the constitutional analysis and
instead focus the inquiry on the constitutional provisions that are genuinely affected by magistrate adjudication.
Part I describes the exceptions to the general requirement that the
judicial function be performed by article III judges and demonstrates
that the balancing test used in the complex separation of powers analysis
of administrative adjunct constitutionality also has been applied to justify
the seemingly endless constitutional uses of magistrates in the district
courts. Part II outlines the relevant history and development of the magistrate's office and functions and provides a description of the statutory
authority upon which the magistrate system operates. Part III discusses
the article III rights and rationales implicated in magistrate adjudication.
Part III then argues that, despite the traditional separation of powers
arguments against the constitutionality of magistrate adjudication, federal court decisions emphasize the individual litigant's due process rights
and not the separation of powers as the predominant factor in the determination of constitutionality. Part IV applies the Note's advocated fundamental fairness analysis to the example problem of magistrateconducted felony voir dire presented in the Ford case. The Note concludes that, despite the potential implication of fundamental fairness
through increased magistrate adjudication, the very "safeguards" that
ensure the constitutionality of magistrate referrals (under the existing
analysis) inevitably assure magistrate competency, the reliability of magistrate decisions, and the fundamental fairness of magistrate
adjudication.
I.

The Constitutionality of Non-Article III Courts

A. Article M and the Separation of Powers
An independent judiciary remains one of the great tenets of the
United States Constitution's system of checks and balances. 7 The judicial branch must be free from the influence of the legislative and the executive branches, lest they affect judicial decisionmaking. To maintain an
independent judiciary, the Framers prescribed that all article III judges
receive life tenure and irreducible salaries. 8 Article III protections insu7. Alexander Hamilton believed that "[t]he complete independence of the courts ofjustice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution" and further agreed with Montesquieu that
"'there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers.' " THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (quoting C.
MONTESQUIEU, SPiRrr OF LAWS, Vol. I, 181 (1768)).
8. Hamilton stressed the importance of life tenure to an independent judiciary:
If... the courts ofjustice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so
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late judges from the influence of the rival branches and therefore help
preserve an independent judiciary and the tripartite system of government. Congressional creation of any non-article III court exercising article III judicial functions raises serious questions concerning the
preservation of the separation of powers9 because of the possibility of
increased congressional control over the judiciary. The requirement that
only article III judges with tenure and salary protections exercise the
"judicial power of the United States"' 0 remains the basis for questions
and objections concerning the grant of judicial functions to federal
magistrates. I
B. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
2
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., '
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the exercise of the judicial
power by non-article III courts when it struck down the 1978 Bankruptcy Act. 13 Under the expanded provisions of the Act, Northern Pipemuch as this to that independent spirit... essential to the faithful performance of so
arduous a duty.
Id. at 469. Hamilton also emphasized the need for an irreducible salary: Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of
judges than a fixed provision for their support.... In the general course of human
nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. And we can
never hope to see . . . the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative
power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on
the occasional grants of the latter.
THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 472 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
In his Northern Pipeline opinion, Justice Brennan reaffirmed Hamilton's position, stating
that "[a]s an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances, and as a
guarantee of judicial impartiality, Art. III both defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 58 (1982).
9. " 'The Framers regarded the checks and balances that they built into the tripartite
Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment ... of one branch
at the expense of the other.'" Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57-58 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam)); see also Note, Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1035-38
(listing several article III rationales for the insulation of judicial functions and warning against
potential congressional encroachments).
10. In Northern Pipeline, Justice Brennan observed: "[O]ur Constitution unambiguously
enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial Power of the United States' must be
reposed in an independent Judiciary." 458 U.S. at 60.
11. Magistrates do not possess the salary and tenure protections envisioned by the Framers as essential to an independent judiciary and a meaningful separation of powers. Unlike
article III judges, full time magistrates serve for a fixed term of eight years, and although their
salary may not be diminished during their term, Congress remains free to eliminate that protection. 28 U.S.C. § 634(b) (1979). Magistrates are appointed by the judges of the respective
district courts in which they serve, not by the President with the Senate's advice and consent.
28 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. 1987).
12. 458 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1982).
13. Pub. L. 95-598, tit. II, § 241 (a), 92 Stat. 2668 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471-
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line petitioned for bankruptcy and filed suit against Marathon for
contract damages in the same bankruptcy court. Marathon sought dismissal of the contract claims and contended that the 1978 Bankruptcy
Act unconstitutionally conferred article III powers on bankruptcy
judges. In upholding Marathon's assertion, 14 the Court discussed two
categorical exceptions to exclusive vesting of judicial power in article III
courts and judges: legislative--or article I-courts and adjuncts. 1 5 The
Court's discussion of these exceptions in relation to the requirements of
article III provided some guidance for determining the constitutionality

of magistrate adjudication. Despite the constitutional restrictions on the
creation of courts and quasi-judicial offices, Northern Pipelinerecognized
that the creation of and adjudication by some non-article III courts and
offices would be constitutionally permissible.' 6 In the sections that follow, this Note examines these exceptions-"legislative" courts and "adjunct" officers and tribunals-to determine the magistrate's place in nonarticle III adjudication.
(1) Legislative Courts

The Northern Pipeline plurality found "three narrow situations" in
which legislative, "article I" courts created by Congress or the Executive
may exercise judicial power outside the confines of article III:17 (1) con1482 (Supp. 1987)). The 1978 Bankruptcy Act established a bankruptcy court in each district
court. Bankruptcy judges were to be appointed for a fourteen year term with salaries set by
statute and subject to adjustment. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (Supp. IV,1986). Bankruptcy
judges also received jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings" arising under or related to cases
brought under the statute. See id § 1471(b). The bankruptcy judges' extensive jurisdiction
included the power to hold jury trials and to issue declaratory judgments, writs of habeas
corpus, and all writs necessary to aid in the new courts' jurisdiction. See id § 1471. The Act
also contained provisions that granted appellate jurisdiction to panels of bankruptcy judges.
See id § 1471(b).
14. Northern Pipeline held that the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act was unconstitutional
because it removed "'essential attributes of judicial power' from the Art. III district court"
and placed these attributes with a non-article III "adjunct." 458 U.S. at 87 (quoting Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). Northern Pipeline became the leading authority on congressional power to create inferior courts within constitutional limitations. A divided Supreme
Court (Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, Justice
O'Connor joined Justice Rehnquist in the concurrence, the Chief Justice wrote a solo dissent,
and Justice Stevens joined Justice White in dissent) struck down the 1978 Act because: (1)
bankruptcy judges were not article III judges, id. at 60-61; (2) bankruptcy courts did not fit
under the narrow "legislative" court exception to article III, id at 84-87; and (3) bankruptcy
courts under the scheme did not meet the Court's definition of "adjunct" judicial officers, id at
64-70.
15. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (Congress has the power to "constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court"); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77-78 ("this Court has accepted
factfinding by an administrative agency as an adjunct to the Art. III court") (citations
omitted).
16. 458 U.S. at 80-81.
17. The Northern Pipeline plurality upheld the constitutionality of legislative or article I
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gressionally created "territorial courts"; 18 (2) military courts-martial;1 9
and (3) administrative and legislative courts with power to adjudicate
cases involving "public rights."' 20 Because the bankruptcy courts under
the 1978 Act did not "fall within any of the historically recognized" exceptions, the Northern Pipeline Court held that the bankruptcy courts
under scrutiny were not within the constitutionally permissible "legislative court" category. Thus, the Bankruptcy Act's grant of adjudicative
power to bankruptcy judges violated article 111.21
courts and noted that each establishment of an article I court "recogniz[ed] a circumstance in
which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the congressional assertion of a power to create legislative
courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of powers." Id. at 64.
18. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828), was the first case to
observe an article IV- derived congressional power to create territorial courts outside article III
restrictions. Article IV bestows upon Congress the "[p]ower to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2; see Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64-65.
19. In support of an express reservation for Congress and the Executive to create courts
of military jurisdiction, the Northern Pipeline plurality cited the Constitution's grant of congressional power "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy" and "[to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 13, 14, as well
as the fifth amendment (providing an exception to the grand jury requirement for cases arising
out of land or naval forces) and article II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for President power as Commander in Chief). 458 U.S. at 66. The Court stated:
Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval
offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations; and . . .the
power to do so is given without any connection between it and the 3d article of the
Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed, .... the two
powers are entirely independent of each other.
Id. (quoting Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How) 65, 79 (1857)).
20. Although Justice Brennan's Northern Pipeline plurality opinion conceded that "[tihe
distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our
precedents," he did assert that "a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise 'between the
government and others.' " 458 U.S. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451
(1929)). Justice Brennan further noted that in these cases
[a]rising "between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection
with the.., constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments,"...
the Framers expected that Congress would be free to commit such matters completely to nonjudicial executive determination, and ... there [is] no constitutional
objection to Congress' ... committing their determination to a legislative court or an
administrative agency.
Id. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). Public rights matters presumably do not require article III adjudication. "Private-right disputes," however, involving
the liability of one individual to another, do require article III adjudication. Id. at 69-70. Justice Brennan recognized that the presence of the United States as a party is a "necessary but
not sufficient, means of distinguishing 'private rights' from 'public rights.' " Id. at 69. He
noted, however, that even within the scope of the "public rights" doctrine, the "presumption is
in favor of Art. III courts." Id. at 69 n.23.
21. Id. at 76. On the legislative court question, Justice Brennan concluded:
[T]his Court has identified three situations in which Art. III does not bar the creation
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(2) Adjuncts
Although Northern Pipeline discussed adjunct courts as the second
category of constitutional non-article III courts, adjunct courts (unlike
the separate legislative courts) actually operate within a district court or

subject to direct district court review. This "connection" to an article III
court distinguishes adjunct review of congressionally created rights from
the more independent adjudication of legislative courts. 22
Two types of adjunct court are permissible under Northern Pipeline:
"class one" adjuncts, which are administrative agency tribunals adjudicating "congressionally created rights, '2 3 and "class two" adjuncts,
whose judicial officers assist the district court in the adjudication of substantive law and constitutional rights. 24 Federal magistrates who conof legislative courts. In each of these situations, the Court has recognized certain
exceptional powers bestowed upon Congress by the Constitution or by historical consensus. Only in the face of such an exceptional grant ofpower has the Court declined
to hold the authority of Congress subject to the general prescriptions of Art. III.
It at 70. Justice Brennan's definitions and boundaries of "legislative courts" as exceptions to
article III become somewhat confusing in light of Justice Rehnquist's Northern Pipeline concurrence. Justice Rehnquist found the division of legislative courts into three narrow categories unnecessary. Instead, he contended that non-article III courts may not adjudicate
disputes arising under state or common law, absent litigant consent. Under Justice Rehnquist's view, the Bankruptcy Act does not necessarily violate article III, but denying the defendant article III adjudication on a claim arising under state law does. Id at 89-92
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
22. "'[A] scheme of Art. I courts that provides for appellate review by Art. III courts
should be less controversial than a legislative attempt to entirely avoid judicial review in a
constitutional court."' Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 599-600
(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 115 (White, J.,
dissenting)).
23. The plurality cited Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), as the first case to uphold
the use of administrative agencies empowered by a congressional scheme to "make initial factual determinations pursuant to a federal statute." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77-78. Justice Brennan also noted that limitations on the statutory agency's enforcement power and a
limited factfinding function involving enforcement of the congressionally created right justified
the placement of some judicial function in such an adjunct tribunal "[s]o long as 'the essential
attributes of the judicial power' are retained in the Article III court," id at 77-78 (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)), and "so long as Congress' adjustment of the traditional manner of adjudication can be sufficiently linked to its legislative power to define substantive rights," id at 77-78 n.29 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 n.7 (1977)).
Thus, Northern Ppeline concluded that "when Congress creates a substantive federal
right, it possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right may be
adjudicated-including the assignment to an adjunct of some functions historically performed
by judges." Id at 80. This "administrative adjunct" resembled the third "legislative court"
exception to article III: administrative courts with the power to adjudicate cases involving
"public rights." See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The required district court review
accompanying this type of court distinguished it from tribunals independent of district court
review and placed it properly within an "adjunct" classification. Id. at 81.
24. The adjunct labels, "class one" and "class two," were not used in Northern Pipeline,
but were developed for brevity and clarity in Note, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 566 n.26.
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duct certain trial and pretrial functions, and exercise their jurisdiction as
in and for the district court fall squarely into this second category of
adjunct that Northern Pipeline held acceptable under article

111.25

In in-

stances of class one adjunct jurisdiction, the administrative law judge
may make determinations affecting congressionally created rights only.
Because the district court retains the power to adjudicate state-created or
common-law rights, the district court presumably maintains the "essential attributes of the judicial power," thus avoiding any article III transgressions. 26 Similarly, because magistrates operate within the district
court, the judicial power is preserved in cases of magistrate adjudication.
Although the maintenance of judicial power within the district court is
used to explain the constitutionality of these specifically defined adjuncts,
the recognized transfer of adjudicative power illustrates the loosening of
strict article III requirements in adjunct adjudication.
C. Constitutional Balancing
The "frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents" of
cases involving article III courts led Justice Rehnquist to analogize the
law in this area to "a judicial 'darkling plain' where ignorant armies have
clashed by night."' 27 Faced with clashing constitutional and expediency
concerns, the Supreme Court adopted a balancing approach for determining the constitutionality of non-article III adjudication. This balancing test, based on Justice White's Northern Pipeline dissent, 28 was applied
Northern Pipeline's "administrative" courts fall under class one, and federal magistrates constitute the class two adjunct. The distinctions are helpful for convenience in comparing the
constitutional requirements of the two types of adjunct classes.
25. The Northern Pipeline plurality recognized United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667
(1980), as a decision upholding proper magistrate use in the district court. In Raddatz, the
Court held that a magistrate presiding over a motion to suppress hearing "did not violate the
constraints of Art. III." Id. at 684. The Raddatz Court found that if "the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations were subject to de novo review by the district court," the
reference did not violate article III, especially since the district judge "was free to rehear the
evidence or to call for additional evidence." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 79; see Raddatz,
447 U.S. at 676-77, 681-83. Because the magistrate only considered motions upon reference
from the district court, and because the magistrate was appointed and subject to removal by
the district court, the Raddatz majority believed that the district judge sufficiently maintained
"the ultimate [power of] adjudicatory determination" over the pretrial motion. Id. at 676.
26. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81. In the case of magistrates, the district court maintains its judicial power through its exercise of certain review standards on nondispositive and
dispositive pretrial and trial matters. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. In cases of
consensual reference, however, the maintenance of the "judicial power" becomes less clear,
creating the debate over the constitutionality of the amendments to the 1979 Magistrates Act
that allow the entry of final judgments by magistrates upon prior litigant consent. See infra
notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
27. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The allusion to
Matthew Arnold's poem, Dover Beach, suggests the federal judiciary's confusion regarding the
limits on article III in general and on federal magistrate adjudication in particular.
28. Arguing for the constitutionality of the 1978 Bankruptcy Court scheme, Justice
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in Thomas v. Union CarbideAgriculturalProduct Co.2 9 and Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,30 in which the Supreme Court authorized broader non-article III adjudication.
In Thomas, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the arbitration provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, 3 1 claiming that the Act's arbitration scheme "transgressed [article
III limitations] by allocating to arbitrators the functions of judicial officers and severely limiting review by an Article III court."' 32 The
Supreme Court held that the arbitration provision was-within the bounds
of acceptable non-article III adjudication, thus expanding the scope of
Northern Pipeline's public rights doctrine to permit the resolution of
claims and counterclaims through non-article III
common-law
33
arbitration.
Similarly, the Schor Court further expanded the public rights doctrine to allow non-article III administrative determinations. 34 In Schor,
the respondent challenged the constitutionality of the Commodity Fu-

tures Trading Commission's (CFTC) jurisdiction over the petitioner's
White advocated that article III "should be read as expressing one value that must be balanced
against competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities." Id. at 113 (White, J.,
dissenting).
29. 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985).
30. 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
31. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1978). The Act, which requires manufacturers of pesticides to submit research data to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), allows the EPA to use
previously submitted data in considering an application for registration of a similar product by
another, "follow-on" registrant. Section 3(c) of the Act holds that the EPA may only consider
previously submitted data if the "follow-on" registrant has offered to compensate the original
registrant for use of the data and provides for binding arbitration if the registrants fail to agree
on compensation. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1978). Thirteen chemical firms, unsatisfied
with the potential compensation available through arbitration, challenged the arbitration provision of the Act.
32. 473 U.S. at 576.
33. Id. at 594. In upholding the arbitration scheme of the FIFRA, the Thomas Court
took a balancing approach to the constitutionality of non-article III adjudication. After stating that the Constitution does not require that every federal question be determined by an
article III judge, the Court additionally maintained that "practical attention to substance,"
rather than a "doctrinaire reliance on formal categories" should guide the application of article
III. Ida at 587. With this in mind, the Court found that because the "right" arising under
FIFRA did not depend on or replace a right under state law, and because the parties had an
opportunity to appeal to an article III court for review of the arbitrator's decisions, FIFRA's
arbitration provision did not "threaten[ ] the independent role of the Judiciary in our constitutional scheme." Id. at 590.
34. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 589 (1985)). Schor and Thomas both rejected the requirement that public rights cases
involve the federal government as a party of record. "If the identity of the parties alone determined the requirements of Article III, under appellee's theory the constitutionality of many
quasi-adjudicative activities carried on by administrative agencies involving claims between
individuals would be thrown into doubt." Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587. Further, the potential
"private" rights adjudicated in Thomas and Schor were "'so closely integrated into a public
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common-law counterclaims. 35 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of CFTC's jurisdiction over the counterclaim and, in doing so,
adopted a balancing test for determining the constitutionality of non-article III adjudication:
In determining the extent to which a given congressional decision to
authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Article III
tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch, the Court has declined to adopt formalistic and unbending
rules ....

[I]n reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a

number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with
an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will have on
the assigned role of the federal judiciary. ... [These factors include]

the extent to which the "essential attributes of judicial power" are reserved to Article III courts, ... [and conversely,] the extent to which
the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove
Congress to depart from the requirements of Article 111.36
The Schor balancing test thus may be applied to determine the constitutionality of the increased judicial functions delegated to federal magistrates. Two factors strongly encourage increased magistrate
jurisdiction: (1) the huge backlog in the federal courts, and (2) the potential for faster 37 and more affordable federal litigation for less affluent parregulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.' "Schor, 478 U.S. at 840 (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 594).
The Thomas Court disposed with the public/private right, bright line test for determining
the requirements of article III and suggested that acceptable "public rights" adjudication by
article I courts merely involved a non-article III review of congressionally created rights.
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589. Thus, "private rights" that were created by a congressional scheme
and that do not depend on or replace a right to compensation under state law may be adjudicated in non-article III tribunals without provision for article III review. Id. at 592-93.
Although the Thomas Court stated that "Congress has the power, under Article I, to authorize
an agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs and benefits among
voluntary participants ...without providing an Article III adjudication," the Court also held
that "the requirements of Art. III must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate
plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas." Id. at 58991 (citations omitted).
35. The respondent sought reparations from a commodity futures broker for violations of
the Commodity Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § 12(a)(5) (1978). The petitioner filed a diversity
action in federal district court to recover the debit balance owed by the respondent. Schor, 478
U.S. at 837. The respondent convinced the petitioner to dismiss the district court action voluntarily and instead file a counterclaim with the CFTC. Id. at 837-38. When the CFTC ruled
against the respondent and in favor of the broker's counterclaim for the debit balance, the
respondent appealed the constitutionality of CFTC's adjudicatory power under the Act. Id. at
838.
36. 478 U.S. at 851 (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587, 589-93; Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84-86 (1982)).
37. "The [Magistrates] Act has.., been hailed as a necessary jurisdictional change that
will help relieve congestion in district courts caused by crowded dockets and litigation that
must be handled on an accelerated basis." Aug, supra note 1, at 363-64. Examples of cases
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ties.38 Opposing these interests are (1) a litigant's right to an article III
judge, 39 and (2) the preservation of the separation of powers by ensuring
that article III judges exercise the "judicial power."
Litigant consent to magistrate jurisdiction may remedy any
4°
problems involving the litigant's individual right to an article III judge.

The more the matter assigned to the magistrate affects final case disposition, the more necessary litigant consent will be.4 1 Regardless of the potential presence or requirement of litigant consent, however, article III
still demands that only those judges possessing the salary and tenure pro-

tections so important to the Framers' view of an independent judiciary
exercise the judicial power. Thus, increased magistrate adjudication implicates the strict language of article III and, theoretically, the separation
of powers as well.

Magistrate adjudication of nondispositive matters permits the district court judge to retain the final decisionmaking power.42 When the
magistrate makes findings bearing upon final case disposition or actually

enters judgments with litigant consent, however, the district court judge
cannot claim to have maintained the judicial power, even if the litigants
have agreed before trial to appeal directly to the district court. The
transfer of final decisionmaking powers to magistrates does not threaten
that must be handled expeditiously include "employment discrimination .... habeas corpus
petitions and criminal proceedings governed by the Speedy Trial Act of 1974." Id. at 364 n.7.
38. Congress created magistrates to provide federal court access to litigants unable to
afford the costs of delay in the federal courts. S. REP No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted
in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1469, 1472. This observation also has been made
by critics of the magistrate system, who believe that providing magistrate adjudication for
"economically disadvantaged litigants" encourages the development of a two-tiered system of
justice in the federal courts. See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 554 (9th Cir. 1984) (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (Congress' "explicit intent to induce the poor to choose magistrates is matched by an equally unsettling"
intent to refer to magistrates those "cases which do not require sophisticated legal
knowledge").
39. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
40. In Schor, however, the Court did offer this cautionary word on the panacea of
consent:
This is not to say, of course, that if Congress created a phalanx of non-Article III
tribunals equipped to handle the entire business of the Article III courts without any
Article III supervision or control and without evidence of valid and specific legislative necessities, the fact that the parties had the election to proceed in their forum of
choice would necessarily save the scheme from constitutional attack.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986). This caveat to
legislative court jurisdiction does not apply directly to magistrate adjudication, however, since
magistrates are seen as sufficiently within the supervision or control of article III courts.
41. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
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article III's separation of powers, 4 3 however, since magistrates operate
44
without any real undue influence from Congress or the Executive.
Even without the risk of injury to the tripartite system, courts still
apply a balancing approach to justify the use of magistrates in the name
of expedient
federal justice within the perceived requirements of article
III. 45 In situations affecting a litigant's right to article III adjudication,
the magistrate must secure uncoerced consent before proceeding. To satisfy the requirement that the judicial power be vested in judges enjoying
article III protections, standards of review exist for certain magistrate
findings. When magistrates receive referrals for these findings, the judge
evidently "maintains" the final decisionmaking function, and the magistrate operates only in an assistant, or para-judge capacity.
When magistrates receive the power to enter final judgments, several
factors provide enough district court "control" to keep the "judicial
power" within the article III court: (1) the presence of consent; (2) the
judge's power to vacate the reference; (3) the fact that the district has
appointed the magistrate; and (4) the parties' pretrial option to appeal
directly to the district court. These elements, when added together and
mixed with congressional intent,4 6 seem to allay any fears regarding the
47
erosion of an independent judiciary.
43. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
44. Magistrates do not threaten the separation of powers because the "structural principle" of article III exists only to
safeguard[ ] the role of the Judicial Branch [within the] tripartite system by barring
congressional attempts to transferjurisdictionfor the purpose of emasculating constitutional courts ....
thereby preventing "the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other." [This principle, however,] does not relate to the
performance of duties within the judicial branch.... There is no reason to condemn
a delegation of power within the judicial branch by an Article III judge to an officer
who is appointed by the court and whose actions are not only under the judge's
instructions but are subject to plenary review.
United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1447 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59
(1982)).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1980) (the Magistrates Act
"strikes the proper balance between the demands of due process and the constraints of Art.
III").
46. Congress wished to provide for more expedient litigation in the district court by expanding the use of magistrates under the supervision of the district court judges, and within
the bounds of article III. See The FederalMagistratesAct of 1979, S. 237: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,96th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Hearing].
47. In his Schor dissent, Justice Brennan spoke against the balancing test approach and
cautioned that its "danger ... is... that as individual cases accumulate in which the Court
finds that the short-term benefits of efficiency outweigh the long-term benefits of judicial independence, the protections of Article III will be eviscerated." Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 863-64 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although Justice
Brennan in Schor opposed a legislative court more independent from article III supervision and
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No combination of these elements, however, realistically secures the
district court judge the final power of decision. Actual, diligent review of
magistrate findings depends upon the nature of the original reference and
the consent or objection of the parties. The "factors" taken as a whole
merely assure that litigants may receive access to an "independent" decisionmaker (albeit in an often illusory de novo capacity). Additionally,
the factors ensure that the judicial branch remains "insulated" from

damaging congressional or executive encroachment.
II.

Development and Expansion of the
Federal Magistrate's Role

The debate over the constitutionality of magistrates as non-article
III adjuncts exercising the judicial power began almost immediately after
the office's creation. In response to an increasingly overwhelming federal
court docket,4 8 Congress replaced the often criticized United States commissioner system 4 9 with the passage of the Federal Magistrates Act of
control than the federal magistrates, he warned that "Congress can seriously impair Article
III's structural and individual protections without assigning away "'the entire business of
Article III courts."' Id at 866 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting majority opinion, id. at 855).
Justice Brennan worried that Congress may "dilut[e] the judicial power" in its attempts to
provide for more efficient dispute resolution. Id (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
This expression of caution by Justice Brennan reflects the main current of misgivings surrounding increased federal magistrate jurisdiction.
48. In 1968, 340 authorized district judgeships carried a combined caseload of 70,961
civil cases and 32,207 criminal cases (a total of 303 cases per judgeship). S. REP. No. 74, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1469, 1470.
49. See Hearing supra note 46, at 15 (statement of Hon. Otto R. Skopil, Jr., Chief Judge,
U.S. District Court, Portland, Ore.).
Commissioners were authorized to execute a variety of duties, including examination
under oath, FED. R. Civ. P. 53; issuance of arrest warrants, FED R. CRIM. P. 4, search warrants, FED R. CRIM. P. 41, and subpoenas, FED R. CRIM.P. 17; preliminary examination of
arrestees, FED R. CRIM. P. 5; issuance of warrants of removal to another district, FED R.
CRIM. P. 40; and release of defendants on bail, FED R. CRAM. P. 46. Additionally, commissioners were authorized to try petty offenses with penalties not in excess of six months imprisonment or a $500 fine or both. In creating the office of the magistrate, Congress expanded its
criminal trial jurisdiction granting magistrates the power to try minor offenses carrying penalties not exceeding one year imprisonment or a $1,000 fine or both. In civil cases, commissioners administered oaths, acknowledgements, affidavits, and depositions. See H.R. REP. No.
1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4252,
4254.
In 1968, there was general agreement regarding the confusion surrounding the commissioner system. The commissioners misunderstood their positions, and the fee system under
which they operated inevitably promoted injustice. TPO, Inc. v. McMUllen, 460 F.2d 348, 351
(7th Cir. 1972). Additionally, only two-thirds of the commissioners were members of the bar,
which made it difficult to operate the system with any uniformity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Id. Because the commissioners were unable to understand and apply the sophisticated
rules of constitutional law, they became the "forgotten men" of the federal courts, receiving
less and less responsibility. Id Congress thus was faced with the question of eliminating the
system, lessening its importance, or improving it with substantial revisions. Id
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1968. 50 The powers that Congress bestowed upon magistrates in 1968
included all duties formerly exercised by the commissioners, 1 as well as
"additional duties.., not inconsistent with the Constitution. ' 52 Understandably, the 1968 Act prompted considerable litigation as courts attempted to define the limits of the "additional duties" provision. 3
Although many district courts recognized the clause as an opportunity to
expand the magistrate's role in reducing district court dockets,5 4 questions arose regarding how far the district courts could go in granting
to
55
magistrates powers traditionally reserved for article III judges.
Wary of potential article III encroachments by magistrates, the
Supreme Court momentarily checked a continued expansion of magistrate powers in Wingo v. Wedding.56 The Wingo Court ruled that the
Federal Magistrates Act's "additional duties" clause did not permit magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings on a federal habeas corpus petition because the Habeus Corpus Act 57 required an article III judge.58
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan chose not to confront the article III argument.5 9 Instead, he interpreted the 1968 Act narrowly and
found that there was no legislative intent to justify granting to magistrates powers plainly reserved for a "federal judge" in the Habeas
Corpus Act. 60 Avoiding an article III analysis, the Court merely ruled
50. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108-1114 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639
(1982 & Supp. 1987)). The original Magistrates Act provided for full time magistrates with
substantial salaries and an eight year term of office, and required them to be members of the
state's highest bar. These provisions assured that magistrates would be more competent arbiters than the part time, underpaid, often nonlawyer commissioners.
51. See supra note 49.
52. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1113 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1982)).
"Additional duties" included, but were not limited to: (1) power to serve as special master in
civil cases pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) assistance to the district judge
in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings in civil and criminal cases; and (3) preliminary review of habeas corpus petitions. Id.
53. Comment, After Northern Pipeline, supra note 1, at 195-97; Note, Expanding Influence, supra note 1, at 468; see also TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 350-59 (7th Cir.
1972) (extensive review of legislative history and intent).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6162, 6164.
55. See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 352-54 (7th Cir. 1972) (magistrate ruling
on dispositive motion violated 1968 Magistrates Act); Reed v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 459
F.2d 121, 123 (1st Cir. 1972) (district court's deference to magistrate findings violated 1968
Act).
56. 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1971).
58. Wingo, 418 U.S. at 472; see also Note, Expanding Influence, supra note 1, at 469 n.28
(comparing differing, pre-Wingo rulings by various courts on the magistrate's role in evidentiary hearings).
59. Wingo, 418 U.S. at 467 n.4.
60. Id. at 469 (emphasis in original).

April 1989]

MAGISTRATES AND FELONY VOIR DIRE

Corpus Act through
that Congress did not intend to overrule the 6Habeas
1
the passage of the Federal Magistrates Act.
62
In response to Wingo and other federal appellate court decisions
that potentially frustrated the legislative desire to refer more matters to
magistrates, 63 Congress amended the Magistrates Act in 1976.64 Determined to alleviate federal court congestion, Congress expanded the role
of magistrates under the discretion and direction of district court
judges. 65 The amendment explicitly codified magistrate functions and
replaced the vague "additional duties" language that split the federal circuits over the 1968 Act's interpretation.6 6 The 1976 amendments thus
61. IM at 469-70. The majority relied primarily on Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342
(1941), in construing the Habeas Corpus Act requirement that the district judge hear the prisoner's testimony, rather than rely upon the magistrate's findings and a recorded transcript,
when making a requested de novo review of the magistrate's recommendations. The Holiday
Court held that the district judge, and not a commissioner, "should himself have heard the
prisoner's testimony and, in the light of it and other testimony, himself have found the facts
and based his disposition of the cause upon his findings." Holiday, 313 U.S. at 354.
Chief Justice Burger, in his Wingo dissent, strongly disagreed with the majority's application of Holiday, as well as their reading of the Magistrates Act's legislative intent. The Chief
Justice contended that, by changing the words "court, justice or judge" to "court" in the
current statute (28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1971)), Congress intended to avoid the Holiday requirement
that a prisoner be given an opportunity to be heard before by a district judge. Additionally,
magistrates possessed more legal expertise and credentials than did their commissioner predecessors. This expertise lessened the danger of judicial adjudication by a less competent judicial
officer. See Wingo, 418 U.S. at 475-76 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger
further argued that a district judge's grant of the factfinding power to a magistrate in a habeas
corpus evidentiary hearing is within the 1968 Magistrates Act's "additional duties" clause.
Although the Chief Justice believed that the "final limitation of the Act" needed "little discussion" in Wingo, he felt that as long as the district court judge reserved the power of "ultimate
decision," the magistrate factfinding referral complied with article III. Id at 486-87 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
62. See Ellis v. Buckhoe, 491 F.2d 716, 717 (6th Cir. 1974) (article III judge must conduct evidentiary hearing); Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268, 1271 (6th Cir. 1972) (judge
may not abdicate administrative appeal to a magistrate); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348,
359 (7th Cir. 1972) (magistrate may not rule on dispositive matters such as motion to dismiss
and summary judgment); Rainha v. Cassidy, 454 F.2d 207, 208 (Ist Cir. 1972) (magistrate
may not conduct preliminary evidentiary hearing).
63. See H.R. REp. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4252, 4254-55 (U.S. magistrate system created "to cull from the ever-growing
workload of the U.S. district courts matters that are more desirably performed by a lower tier
of judicial officer").
64. Pub. L. No. 94-557, 90 Stat 2729 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1976)).
65. H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6162, 6162.
66. Id. at 6167-68. The 1976 Act responded to the controversy regarding the scope of
permissible magistrate functions by clarifying and further defining the "additional duties" that
may be assigned to magistrates. Id. at 6162. The rewritten additional duties provision included a more explicit list of pretrial matters acceptable for reference to a magistrate. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982). Despite this clearer expression of congressional intent, the 1976
Act still provided that a "magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not incon-
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allowed judges to assign magistrates the power to hear and determine
appropriate, with the
any pretrial matter the district court considered
67
exception of certain dispositive motions.
The duties described in the 1976 Act that were assignable to magistrates carried corresponding provisions for appropriate district court review. Under'the codified amendments, a magistrate's determination on
any nondispositive pretrial motions is final unless the referring district
court judge (upon a party's request for reconsideration) finds the magistrate's ruling "clearly erroneous or contrary to law."' 68 Although a magistrate may not make a final determination on case- dispositive matters,
the district judge may designate a magistrate to review dispositive motions and habeas corpus petitions and to conduct evidentiary hearings on
these matters if necessary. 69 The magistrate submits the review, recommendations, or findings of fact to the district judge, who then reviews de
novo 70 any contested portions of the magistrate's findings. The district
court judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate's work before disposing of the matter. 7 1 The district judge's de
novo review power in case-dispositive matters, the provisions for review
and reversal by the district court judge of any magistrate finding on a
nondispositive matter that is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law," and
sistent with the Constitution." Id. § 636(b)(3) (1982). This language left the district courts
free to experiment, but it also left the magistrates open to further constitutional challenges.
67. H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6162, 6169-71. The "excepted motions" included: (1) motion for injunctive
relief; (2) motion for judgment on the pleadings; (3) motion for summary judgment; (4) motion to dismiss or quash an indictment made by the defendant; (5) motion to suppress evidence
in a criminal case; (6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted; and (7) motion to involuntarily dismiss an action for failure to comply with an order
of the court. Id. at 1670-71.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1982).
69. Id. § 636(b)(1)(B).
70. The Supreme Court has held that a proper de novo review requires an independent
determination by the reviewer. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 23
(1974); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967). The
definition and requirement of a "hearing de novo" put forth by Congress in the 1976 Magistrates Act is somewhat relaxed from the literal meaning of "de novo," but nevertheless does
comply with the Supreme Court's requirement:
The use of the words "de novo determination" [was] not intended to require the
judge to actually conduct a new hearing on contested issues. Normally the judge, on
application, will consider the record which has been developed before the magistrate
and make his own determination on the basis of that record, without being bound to
adopt the findings and conclusions of the magistrate. In some specific instances,
however, it may be necessary for the judge to modify or reject the findings of the
magistrate, to take additional evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to
the magistrate for further proceedings.
H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6162, 6163.

71. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1982). The judge also may receive further evidence or resubmit the matter to the magistrate with instructions for further factfinding. Id.
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the district court's power to appoint and remove magistrates 72 theoretically keep the magistrate's duties within the boundaries of article III.
These safeguards are designed to ensure the constitutionality of magistrate adjudication while furthering the "congressional intent that the
magistrate assist the district judge in a variety of pretrial and preliminary
matters thereby facilitating
the ultimate and final exercise of the adjudi'73
catory function.
Although the 1976 amendments solidified the limited use of magis-

trates in civil cases,74 magistrate trial jurisdiction did not increase significantly until the 1979 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act
allowed judges to designate magistrates more freely. 75 Upon a district
court judge's designation and the consent of both parties, magistrates

may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter,

including the entry of a judgment. 76 When appealing from a judgment
entered by a magistrate acting under "consensual reference," the parties
may proceed directly to the circuit court, or they may choose review by
77
the referring district judge sitting in an appellate capacity.

The 1979 amendments also expanded the magistrate's criminal jurisdiction by allowing magistrates to preside at the jury trial of all federal
72. See generally id § 631 (providing guidelines for evaluation and appointment and procedures for possible removal of magistrates by the district court).
73. H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6162, 6167.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1982); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b) (1979).
In 1979, rule 53(b) stated:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be
tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when issues are complicated; in actions
to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult computation of
damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.
Id. In 1983, rule 53(b) was amended to reflect the new consensual trial powers granted to
magistrates in 1979: "Upon the consent of the parties, a magistrate may be designated to serve
as a special master without regard to the provisions of this subdivision." FED. R. Civ. P.

53(b).
75. See Streepy, supra note 1, at 86.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982). While Congress encouraged district courts to continue
experimentation in the use of magistrates, H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6162, 6162, and some jurisdictions began
referring civil trials to magistrates under the "additional duties" section of the 1976 Magistrates Act, many courts remained "reluctant to step ... into this important area" without
"more specific authority." Hearing,supra note 46, at 18. Furthermore, district courts in the
Seventh Circuit that did allow magistrates complete jurisdiction over civil trials with litigant
consent found the circuit court unwilling to consider the magistrates' verdicts on appeal.
Claiming that magistrates possessed no power to enter final judgments, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals also found that it possessed no appellate jurisdiction over decisions entered
by non-article III judicial officers. See Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Reeds, 552 F.2d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 1977); accordSick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y.,
574 F.2d 689, 693-94 (2d Cir. 1978).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3)-(5) (1982).
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misdemeanors. 78 Prior to the 1979 amendments, criminal defendants
were forced to waive any right to a jury trial when they waived their
right to an article III judge and chose the more expeditious magistrate
adjudication. By allowing magistrates power over misdemeanor jury trials, the 1979 amendments allow defendants access to a jury and the expediting presidence of the magistrate. 79 Lastly, the 1979 amendments
further support the extension of magistrate duties by raising the standards and procedures for magistrate selection. 0 The stricter selection
criteria help ensure that the quality of adjudication at the district court
level will not suffer with increased magistrate references.
Even with these expanded responsibilities, district courts retain considerable control over magistrates. Litigants must consent to have their
cases heard before a magistrate. The court may vacate a reference already made, and it may hear appeals from magistrates' decisions. Finally, the district courts continue to control the appointment of
magistrates. Thus, magistrate adjudication still falls within the class two
adjunct category of constitutional non-article III adjudication.
III.

Magistrates and Article III

The protections of life tenure and an irreducible salary reserved for
the federal judiciary in article III safeguard two preeminent values that
might be threatened by a delegation of authority to magistrates as class
two adjuncts: (1) the maintenance of the constitutional separation of
powers, and more specifically, the protection of the independent judiciary
from influence by the other governmental branches; and (2) a litigant's
8
right to an independent federal judiciary. '
A.

Separation of Powers

Although magistrate adjudication may violate article III's strict language, statutorily controlled magistrates acting within the confines of the
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (1985).
79. Hearing, supra note 46, at 17; Streepy, supra note 1, at 89-91. Although the Senate
report accompanying the 1979 amendments mentioned the possibility of removing the require-

ment of defendant consent for trying petty offenses before a magistrate, S. REP. No. 74, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1469, 1474-75, the
language of the Act still holds defendant consent to be central to a magistrate's petty and

misdemeanor criminal jurisdiction.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 631 (1982). The Senate Judiciary Committee formulated the 1979
amendments because the Committee believed that "more should be done ... to insure to the
greatest extent possible that each and every individual appointed as magistrate will be fully
competent and qualified to perform the full range of the duties of the office." S. REP. No. 74,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1469, 1478.
81. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 1984);
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir.

1984) (Pacemaker11).
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district court pose no real threat to the constitutional requirement of separation of powers. 82 The "safeguards" built into the magistrate system
ensure that the district courts, and not the legislative branch, maintain
control over magistrates. First, the district court retains the power to
appoint and remove magistrates. 83 Second, the district court judge assigns the magistrate certain pretrial or trial matters and may remove
such matters from the magistrate if requested by the parties and upon
proper showing of cause. 84 Finally, the judge may review the magistrate's findings in a de novo or appellate capacity and remains free to
accept or reject certain magistrate findings or recommendations.8 5 These
safeguards prevent the legislative branch from exerting undue influence
on magistrates' decisions.
The district court's retention of these powers over magistrates
prompted Justice Blackmun to observe in United States v. Raddatz 86 that
82. The recent Supreme Court separation of powers case, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
1714 (1986), posed a more genuine separation of powers problem than magistrate adjudication.
In Bowsher, the Court struck down the reporting provisions of § 251 of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (the Gramm-Rudman Act), which allowed the
Comptroller General to exercise executive powers mandating spending reductions in an effort
to eliminate the budget deficit. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (GrammRudman) Act of 1985, §§ 251, 252(a)(3), 2 U.S.C. §§ 901, 902(a)(3) (Supp. 1987). The Court
held that "[t]o permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to
Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the
laws." Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726.
Congressional vesting of executive powers in the hands of the Comptroller General
presents a more realistic possibility of congressional encroachment upon the Executive and
threatens the separation of powers more than magistrate adjudication, which theoretically invites congressional encroachment upon the independent judiciary. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-54
(1986). The Schor Court upheld the congressionally created scheme for non-article III review
of claims arising under the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. at 858. In upholding the scheme,
the Court emphasized the distinction between adjunct, or constitutional, administrative adjudication and the facts of the Bowsher case.
"Unlike Bowsher, this case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional
power at the expense of a coordinate branch. Instead, the separation of powers question
presented in this case is whether Congress impermissibly undermined, without appreciable
expansion of its own power, the role of the Judicial Branch." Schor, 478 U.S. at 856-57. The
Court's observation in Schor offers a useful analogy for the distinction between the separation
of powers problem in Bowsher and the absence of any such problem in the referral of judicial
duties to magistrates.
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(a)-(b) (1982); id. § 631(i).
84. Id. § 636(c)(6).
85. See id. § 636 (a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
86. 447 U.S. 667, 685 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). In response to Justice Marshall's dissent in Raddatz Justice Blackmun stated:
I simply do not perceive the threat to the judicial power or the independence of
judicial decisionmaking that underlies Art. III. We do not face a procedure under
which "Congress [has] delegate[d] to a non-Art. III judge the authority to make final
determinations on issues of fact." Rather, we confront a procedure under which
Congress has vested in Art. III judges the discretionary power to delegate certain
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the only threat to the independence or impartiality of a magistrate comes
from "within, rather than from without, the judicial department." Justice Blackmun's observation counters the contention that magistrates
threaten the separation of powers as agents of congressional control exercising the judicial function within an increasingly less independent judiciary and suggests a different attack on magistrate adjudication:
magistrates operating under district court control create an "extra-independent" judiciary. At least one critic of magistrate constitutionality
believes that magistrates unevenly tip the constitutional balance and separation of powers by vesting too much power in an independent judiciary
in control of quasi-article I judicial officers. 87 Because district judges
control magistrates (presumably to protect the constitutional balance),
congressional and executive powers of appointment and confirmation are
threatened by expanding the duties of judicial officers appointed and controlled only by the district courts. 8 Regardless of this contention's plausibility, such a claim does evince the implausibility of magistrates as a
threat to judicial independence.
Although Congress created the magistrate's office and retains the
power to alter magistrate tenure and salary provisions with additional
legislation, Congress does not possess any actual control over individual
magistrates. The separation of powers rationale underlying article 11189
realistically does not apply to congressionally created adjuncts exercising
functions to competent and impartial assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain
complete supervisory control over the assistants' activities.
Id. at 686 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 703 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
87. Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1053 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting). This argument suggests that magistrates operate independently of the district court, as a separate, congressionally created article I court under tenuous district court
supervision. Courts have rejected this view, however, and consistently accept the federal magistrate as the required "umbilical adjunct," functioning only at the discretion of an article III
judge. See id. at 1045 (the parties' choice of federal magistrate adjudication does not take the
suit outside the district court's jurisdiction, given the magistrate's "adjunct" relationship to the
district court). Because the federal magistrate functions as an adjunct, magistrate adjudication
does not threaten the separation of powers. Thus, when the adjunct is an officer operating
under district court control, litigant consent to magistrate adjudication does not upset the
constitutional structure. See Note, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 569 n.42.
88. See Geras, 742 F.2d at 1053 (Posner, J., dissenting). Among Judge Posner's many
objections to consensual reference is the contention that the magistrate system actually tips the
balance toward a judiciary that is too independent of executive and congressional checks. Id.;
see also Note, Boundaries,supra note 1, at 1062-63 (district court control "over magistrates is
itself inconsistent with the nature of judicial decisionmaking required by article III," and
"[t]he tenure and salary provisions of article III protect judges not only from the political
branches, but from undue influence by other judges as well") (emphasis in original).
89. See supra notes 2 & 9-11 and accompanying text.
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some judicial power upon reference and under the auspices of a district
court judge. 90
B.

Litigant's Rights and Consent

Article III does not provide litigants an "absolute right to the plenary consideration" of every claim by an article III court. 9 1 Rather, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the article III guarantee of "independent
and impartial adjudication" "to protect primarily personal, rather than
structural interests."' 92 This recognition of an individual litigant's right
to an independent federal judiciary raises several questions regarding
magistrate adjudication.
The requirement of litigant consent to magistrate jurisdiction relates
directly to the importance of the right being adjudicated. Pretrial and
trial matters handled by magistrates in the federal courts can be placed in
three categories: (1) nondispositive pretrial matters, which the assigning
district judge reviews upon litigant request, utilizing a "clearly erroneous" or "contrary to law" standard; 93 (2) dispositive matters, which the
assigning judge reviews de novo upon objections by a party to the magistrate's findings or recommendations; 94 and (3) any or all proceedings in a
jury or nonjury civil or misdemeanor criminal matter, including the entry of a judgment upon party consent to magistrate jurisdiction.9 5
90. The Schor Court again dismissed the separation of powers concerns associated with
adjunct tribunals:
[Although] Congress gave the [administrative agency] the authority to adjudicate
such matters. ... [i]n such circumstances, separation of powers concerns are diminished, for it seems self-evident that just as Congress may encourage parties to settle a
dispute out of court or resort to arbitration without impermissible incursions on the
separation of powers, Congress may make available a quasi-judicial mechanism
through which willing parties may, at their option, elect to resolve their differences.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
91. Id. at 848.
92. Id. at 850 (citing Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); 458 U.S. at 95 (White, J., dissenting)). The Schor
Court also stated that the "relevance of concepts of waiver to Article III challenges is demonstrated by [the Court's] decision in Northern Pipeline, in which the absence of consent to an
initial adjudication before a non-Article III tribunal was relied on as a significant factor in
determining that Article III forbade such adjudication." Id. at 849 (citing Northern Pipeline,
458 U.S. at 80 n.31 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). Despite efforts by Justice O'Connor and the
Schor majority to categorize the CFTC scheme as a "public right," the main distinction between Northern Pipeline andSchor lies in the consent issue. In Schor, the party challenging the
CFTC scheme had submitted to its jurisdiction initially, and thus consented. Schor, 478 U.S.
at 838. The Northern Pipeline appellant was unwillingly hailed into bankruptcy court on a
matter under the state common law. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(A) (1982).
94. Id. § 636(b)(1)(B).
95. Id. § 636(c)(1).
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The assignment of magistrates to duties not involving the entry of
final judgments does not require litigant consent because the "final decisionmaking power" remains with the assigning article III judge. 96 In
cases in which magistrates enter final judgments, the parties must decide
before trial whether they will advance any appeal to the appellate court
or to the assigning district judge utilizing an appellate standard of review. 97 In such cases, however, both parties must consent to magistrate
adjudication and "waive" any right to an article III judge. 98 Although
many commentators and judges hesitate to allow waiver of the right to
article III adjudication,9 9 the Supreme Court has recognized a litigant's
right to an article III judge as similar to other waivable constitutional
rights of procedure 100
If litigants do possess rights to an independent judiciary under article III, then they must consent before any waiver of article III adjudica96. See id. § 636(c)(3)- (5) (Supp. 1987).
97. See id. § 636(b)(1)(A)- (C) (1982); see supra notes 68-69 & 71 and accompanying text.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1982).
99. Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing
Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am.,
Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541-43 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (PacemakerII)).
Some believe that the structural provisions of the Constitution cannot be waived, however, and
that the requirement of final article III decisionmaking involves more than the instant litigants'
rights. See Geras, 742 F.2d at 1052 (Posner, J., dissenting) (cases tried by magistrates will
affect the welfare of many people who never appear in federal court); Note, Boundaries,supra
note 1, at 1058-60 ("precedential value" of magistrate decisions made with litigant consent
may affect subsequent litigants).
The Court in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), also
expressed some reservations about a litigant's waiver of constitutional structural provisions:
[O]ur precedents establish that Article III... also serves as "an inseparable element
of... checks and balances." ... To the extent that this structural principle is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty
for the same reason that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Article III, § 2.... When
these Article III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be
dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot
be expected to protect.
Id. at 850-51 (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
58 (1982)). This observation by the Schor Court, however, contradicts its earlier claim that the
"Article III ... guarantee serves to protect primarily personal, rather than structural interests." Id. at 848. Nor does it explain the notion of litigant consent as a recognized remedy for
any constitutional infirmities regarding magistrate adjudication.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Schor recognized this inconsistency in the majority's opinion,
claiming that "a litigant may [n]ever waive his right to an Article III tribunal where one is
constitutionally required. In other words, consent is irrelevant to Article III analysis." Id. at
867 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's view supports the argument that institutional
concerns are implicated by non-article III adjudication.
100. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 848-49 ("as a personal right, Article III's guarantee of an
impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are the other personal constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters
must be tried").
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tion.1° 1 The litigant's choice between adjunct and article III adjudication
must be meaningful before any rights to an article III judge can be seen
as properly waived. 10 2 Some observers wary of increased magistrate references doubt whether litigant consent to magistrate adjudication can
ever be truly voluntary. 10 3 These concerns regarding uncoerced consent
may be sufficiently placated, however, by the strict procedures governing
the entry of party consent.1°4
The federal circuits' widespread acceptance of party consent as a

panacea for any constitutional infirmities associated with magistrate adjudication strongly suggests that any requirement of article III adjudication primarily protects an individual's right to an insulated jurist and
does not implicate the separation of powers.10 5 The separation of powers is threatened more in the area of judicial review of direct congres-

sional or executive action than in the adjudication of private rights at the
district court level. 10 6 Consequently, magistrate adjudication does not
affect the separation of powers, and article III is only implicated 0to7 the
extent that it protects an individual's right to an insulated jurist.'

See S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEWS 1469, 1473 ("voluntary consent of the parties is required before any civil action
may be referred to a magistrate").
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1982). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b) provides:
No district judge, magistrate, or other court official shall attempt to persuade or
induce a party to consent to a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate under this
rule, nor shall a district judge or magistrate be informed of a party's response to the
clerk's notification, unless all parties have consented to the referral of the matter to a
magistrate.
FED. R. Civ. P. 73(b); see Archie v. Christian, 808 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987)
(explaining rule 73 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)).
103. As one dissenting judge pointed out, the "illusion" of consent and free choice "ignores the practical realities behind the Magistrates Act's passage and the very real pressures on
district judges to try to channel more and more cases to magistrates." PacemakerII, 725 F.2d
at 553-54 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Congress created magistrates to provide federal court
access to "economically disadvantaged litigants, unable to afford the delay and cost of waiting." Id. at 554. Such "economic coercion" removes the possibility of true consent. Id.
(citing S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1469, 1472).
104. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1982); supra note 102.
105. See D.L. Auld v. Chrona Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1985);
Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras v.
Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn
Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United
States v. Byers, 730 F.2d 568, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 11819 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v.
Instromedix, Inc. 725 F.2d 537, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (PacemakerII); WhartonThomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 930 (3d Cir. 1983).
106. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
107. The Schor Court believed that "Article III, § 1 serves ...to safeguard [a litigant's]
'right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other
101.

ADMIN.
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Removing the "Judicial Power"

Even if an individual litigant can waive the right to an article III
judge, the entry of final judgments by magistrates may betray the strict
language of article III, which requires that only judges possessing life
tenure and an irreducible salary exercise the judicial power. 10 8 Although
the separation of powers is not implicated by magistrate jurisdiction, 10 9
magistrates exercising the "judicial function" may contravene those requirements. Recognizing the judicial power as "'the power of a court to
decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision,' "110 the "threat"
to article III seemingly increases as magistrates are empowered to dispose of cases and to enter final judgments.
Despite the departure from the language of article III, almost every
federal circuit has ruled that the referral of final decisionmaking power to
magistrates does not violate article III.111 These courts have cited three
factors to demonstrate that the district court still exercises the "judicial
power" and has not abdicated such power to the presiding magistrate:
(1) the district court judge's power to vacate the reference, (2) the magistrate's appointment and case designation by the district court, and (3) the
parties' right to appeal the magistrate's judgment to the district court or
the court of appeals. 1 2 Under these safeguards, the "judicial power"
remains with the article III district court judge. Some observers believe
that the procedures for district court review of magistrate findings fail to
check magistrate decisionmaking adequately.11 3 Nevertheless, courts upholding magistrate constitutionality have pointed only to the district
court's opportunity to review a magistrate's decision as the element main14
taining the required district court control and article III protection.'
Whether or not the safeguards that keep the "judicial power" with
the district court judge are adequate, the traditional rationale underlying
the reluctance to transfer duties to magistrates appears misplaced. The
completion of inherently judicial tasks by non-article III magistrates does
not threaten the separation of powers (the recognized constitutional ends
branches of government.'" 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218
(1980)).
108. See supra notes 2 & 9-11 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
110. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
111. See cases cited supra note 5.
112. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1043-45 (7th Cir.
1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 544-47
(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Pacemaker 11); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922,
930 (3d Cir. 1983).
113. Note, Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1054-55 ("The 1979 Magistrate Act ... removes
the article III judge from the entire decisionmaking process.... The only decision made by the
article III judge is whether to refer a particular case to a magistrate.") (footnotes omitted).
114. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 686 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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promoted by article III protections)."15 Magistrates do not function
under any real pressures from Congress or the Executive.11 6 Beyond the
enforcement of constitutional "original intent," in compliance with the
strict language of article III, the constitutional erosion supposedly
presented by increased use of magistrates appears more doctrinaire than
real. 117

D. Due Process
Despite the traditional article III analysis, magistrate adjudication
does not threaten the separation of powers. Rather, the increased reference of judicial decisionmaking power to magistrates more realistically
threatens due process. In United States v. Raddatz,1 18 a Supreme Court
plurality found that the district court judge's de novo determination and
acceptance of a magistrate's findings at a suppression hearing did not
require the judge to rehear witnesses. The plurality did intimate, however, that if the judge were to reject a magistrate's findings based on the
credibility of the witnesses, the judge could not enter the constitutionally
required independent appraisal without seeing and rehearing the witnesses.1 19 Such deference by the district court judge to the magistrate's
115. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
117. In Commodity Future Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847 (1986), the
Court recognized that the "resolution of claims [challenging] . . . the constitutionality of a
given Congressional delegation of adjudicative functions to a non-Article III body must be
assessed by reference to the purposes underlying the requirements of Article III," and cannot
"turn on conclusory reference to the language of Article III."
118. 447 U.S. 667, 680 (1980). Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Burger ruled that
neither the 1976 Magistrates Act nor the Due Process clause required the district judge to
rehear testimony in conducting a de novo review of the magistrate's findings. Id. at 684. In
construing the Act, Chief Justice Burger found that "Congress intended to permit whatever
reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Id. at 676 (citing Mathews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 275 (1976)). While the judge is not required to rehear the witness, the option of
rehearingsatisfied the "guarantees of due process" that only mandate a "'hearing appropriate
to the nature of the case.' " IM at 677 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
119. Raddatz 447 U.S. at 681 n.7. Chief Justice Burger suggested that the judge need not
hear witnesses to reject or accept the magistrate's findings regarding witness testimony, but if
the judge rejects the magistrate's findings, he must rehear the testimony before entering his
own appraisal:
Neither the statute nor its legislative history reveals any specific consideration of the
situation where a district judge... has doubts concerning the credibility findings of
the magistrate ....
[Wie assume it is unlikely that a district judge would reject a
magistrate's proposed findings on credibility when those findings are dispositive and
substitute his own appraisal; to do so without seeing and hearing ... witnesses whose
credibility is in question could well give rise to serious questions which we do not
reach.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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findings would mean the abdication of the judicial function to a nonarticle III decision maker in contravention of congressional intent. 120
The three dissenting Justices in Raddatz strongly contended that, at
least on issues of credibility, a proper de novo determination could not be
made from the record without a rehearing by the judge.121 Furthermore,
they argued that the fifth amendment's due process clause required rehearing.1 22 Invoking the principle that "the one who decides must
hear," 1 23 Justice Marshall argued that if the district court judge were to
maintain the final decisionmaking power through a de novo determination, due process required that the judge personally examine the demeanor of witnesses.124 Thus, by failing to conduct a rehearing, the
district judge abdicated the final decisionmaking power to the magistrate
in violation of article III.
Under Justice Marshall's due process analysis, a judge cannot enter
a final decision relying only upon the magistrate's recommendations with
respect to issues of credibility, since the demeanor of witnesses cannot be
assessed adequately from a "cold record."'' 25 Under those circumstances, the one who decided would not have heard, thus violating an
important requirement of due process. Additionally, a determination of
witness credibility from a magistrate's hearing record may violate the
language of article III. If the district court judge relies entirely on the
magistrate's findings, then the de novo determination is inadequate to
vest the judicial power in the article III court because the magistrate
constructively will be the final decisionmaker.
120. Id. at 683.
121.

Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., dissenting):

[T]he District Judge could not make the statutorily mandated "de novo determina-

tion" without being exposed to the one kind of evidence that no written record can
ever reveal-the demeanor of the witnesses. In declining to conduct a hearing in this
case, the District Judge thus necessarily gave the Magistrate's prior assessment of the
credibility the kind of "special weight" that the "de novo determination" standard

does not permit.
122.

Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that "due process

requires a district court to rehear crucial witnesses when, as in this case, a suppression turns
only on credibility." Id. at 686 (emphasis in original).
123. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936). Justice Marshall conceded that
this principle "should not be applied with mechanical rigidity" and allowed that the district
court judge may base his factual findings on a record compiled by a magistrate. He cautioned,
however, that factual issues concerning credibility cannot be resolved fairly in such a manner.
Justice Marshall further maintained that when a district judge bases a final determination
concerning credibility solely upon a magistrate's finding, the determination is "so inevitably
arbitrary,and so plainly a blindguess," that it violates due process "under any circumstances."
Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 698-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
124. 447 U.S. at 694-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125.

Id. at 695-96.
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Justice Marshall readily conceded that due process does not require
an article III judge to determine all facts involved in the litigation. 126 He
did contend, however, that at least in cases in which "personal liberty [is]
at stake... a citizen is constitutionally entitled to an independent determination of the case-dispositive facts by an Art. III court." 127 The defendant in Raddatz did not consent to the referral of his suppression
hearing to the magistrate.1 2 Justice Marshall's contention, therefore,
does not preclude the possibility that the right to an article III determination effectively may be waived with defendant consent. Such a possibility enforces the view that litigant consent is the cure for constitutional
problems concerning magistrate adjudication, and it also supports the
notion that article III primarily protects an individual's right to an insu129
lated jurist.
IV.

Fundamental Fairness

Article III considerations regarding magistrate jurisdiction realistically reflect concern for an individual litigant's right to an article III
judge, rather than the preservation of an independent judiciary. Because
litigants possess a recognized right to an article III judge, consent to
magistrate jurisdiction involves a waiver of that right. The requirement
of uncoerced consent guarantees the right to article III adjudication and
ensures due process regarding that right. A litigant who has knowingly
waived his right to an article III judge cannot later claim that the nonarticle III adjudication was a denial of individual due process. The satisfaction of systemic due process, "fundamental fairness," is less clear,
however.1 30 Because most courts upholding magistrate constitutionality
have held that litigant consent remedies most constitutional infirmi126. R at 708-09. Justice Marshall warned, however, that the separation of powers requires that article III judges must retain some factfinding function:
"the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for the investigation and finding of facts... does not require the conclusion that there is no limitation of their use,
and that Congress could completely oust the courts of all determinations of fact by
vesting the authority to make them with finality in its own instrumentalities or in the
Executive Department."
Id (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932)).
127. Id. at 712.
128. Id. at 669.
129. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).
130. In criminal proceedings, fundamental fairness implies a concern for both the individual litigant's right to a fair trial and the justice system's interest in assuring a fair trial. The
justice system has an interest in fair trials since the system's reliability (and thus its integrity
and the community's respect for it) breaks down unless it can ensure fundamental fairness in
all proceedings. See Olimstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (the erosion of protective criminal procedures "breeds contempt for the law .... To
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means... would
bring terrible retribution.") This dual purpose approach to due process is important to the
constitutional system.
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ties,131 the due process analysis regarding magistrate constitutionality
has focused primarily upon individual due process. Opponents of increased non-article III adjudication, however, claim that litigant consent
cannot be the panacea for all constitutional problems. 132 These reservations suggest that systemic due process considerations also should affect
the determination of the constitutionality of non-article III adjudication.
A comparison of the right to counsel and an individual's right to an article III judge illustrates this point.
The right to an article III judge is similar to a criminal defendant's
right to counsel in that both rights are personal to the defendant, and
both are waivable. 133 More importantly, both rights protect individual,
as well as systemic, due process. In all cases in which the possibility of
incarceration exists, an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to appointed counsel. 134 Mere appointment of counsel is not sufficient, however. The sixth amendment also entitles the defendant to "effective
assistance" of counsel. 135 Effective assistance of counsel protects individual rights required by the sixth and fourteenth amendments, 13 6 but it also
safeguards the integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring the
reliability of judgments through the maintenance of fundamental fairness. 137 The criminal justice system might be undermined by an increased number of individual defendants acting as their own counsel.
Although the individual defendants would be assured individual due process through the requirement that waiver of their right to counsel be informed and uncoerced, such a situation would present the possibility of
unfair trials and unreliablejudgments. In such circumstances, systemic
131. D.L. Auld v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1985); Fields
v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb,
Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States
v. Byers, 730 F.2d 568, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 118-19 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d at 543- 44; Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 930 (3d
Cir. 1983); see supra text accompanying note 105.
132. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
133.
Because the right to counsel is personal to the accused, the Supreme Court in Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975), held that the state could not compel a defendant who
wished to proceed pro se to accept appointed counsel. This example of the waiver of a consti-

tutional right that might affect the outcome of a litigation resembles the waiver of a litigant's
right to an article III judge. Litigants waiving the right to an article III judge may affect the
outcome of the proceeding and the system's reliability. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
134. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1984).
135. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
136. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
137. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 ("The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the
assistance of counsel [as] . . . critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just
results.").
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due process (and respect for the system) breaks down.1 38 The civil and
criminal justice systems could be undermined in a similar manner by litigants opting for determination by non-article III magistrates. Although
the individual litigants would be assured of their rights to article III adjudication through the consent requirement,1 39 the system's reliability and
integrity could be affected by non-article III judicial officers delivering
unreliable judgments.
The notion that increased magistrate adjudication potentially undermines the reliability of federal trial court judgments suggests that magistrates are less competent than article III judges appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. Although the district court judge

appoints magistrates for an eight year term and a competitive salary, the
implication is that the office of magistrate does not attract those individuals possessing the judicial skills that warrant a larger, irreducible salary
and life tenure.1 4° No opinion, however, has challenged magistrate con-

138. See Arnella, Rethinking the Functionsof CriminalProcedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 202 (1983) ("American criminal procedure must provide a mechanism that settles the conflict in a manner that induces community
respect for the fairness of its processes as well as the reliability of its outcomes."); see also
Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
Sci. 238, 239 (1966) (analyzing distinctions between and examples of "Crime Control" and
"Due Process" models of criminal justice).
139. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
140. Justice Douglas voiced his concerns about non-article III adjudication when he asserted that
judges... who do not enjoy constitutionaltenure and whose salaries are not constitutionally.protected against diminution during their term in office cannot be Article III
judges.... Judges who sit on Article I courts are chosen for administrative or allied
skills, not for their qualifications to sit in cases involving the vast interests of life,
liberty, or property for whose protection the Bill of Rights and the other guarantees
of the main body of the Constitution... were designed. Judges who might be confirmed for an Article I court might never pass muster for the onerous and life-ordeath duties of Article III judges.
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 606 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). In fairness to federal magistrates, Justice Douglas' observations seem more directed toward legislative court and administrative law judges, or "class one" adjuncts. See supra notes
17-20 & 23-25 and accompanying text. At least one federal appellate judge has recognized the
potential article III merits of federal magistrates and has advocated granting them the protections of life tenure and irreducible salaries. Judge Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit, in a separate
dissent in Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 555
(9th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Pregerson, 3., dissenting) (emphasis added), asserted that although
most judicial business handled by magistrates "involves ordinarypeople," it is "very important." This observation affirms the existence of a "two-tiered" system of justice in the district
court criticized by Judge Schroeder in her dissent in the same case. Id. at 554 (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting). Nevertheless, Judge Pregerson repeated his recommendation that magistrates
"should be awarded Article III protections commensurate with the Article III work that they
now so commendably perform." Id. at 555 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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threaten the sysstitutionality on the ground that non-article III1 4judges
1
tem's integrity through less reliable judgments.
A.

Magistrates and Felony Voir Dire

Although no court has entertained a due process argument against
magistrate adjudication directly, the Fifth Circuit implicitly recognized
such arguments in United States v. Ford.142 Lois Ford was convicted by
a federal jury of stealing government property. Ms. Ford appealed and
contended that the district court erred when it allowed a magistrate to
preside over jury selection. 143 The Fifth Circuit agreed with Ms. Ford
that a magistrate should not conduct felony voir dire, but refused to
overturn the conviction because the trial was "fundamentally fair" and
because Ms. Ford did not object to the magistrate-conducted voir dire.' 4
circuits'
This decision marked at least a temporary halt to the federal
145
continuing extension of acceptable magistrate references.
The Ford majority concluded that magistrate references permissible
under the "other duties" clause 146 did not include the selection of juries
for felony trials. To avoid "constitutional difficulty," the Ford court
strictly read the Magistrates Act and found no congressional intent "to
grant to district judges the power to delegate the trial of felony cases" to
141. One dissenter suggested that non-article III adjudication does threaten the system's
reliability because such judgments may be relied upon by other potential litigants. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit claimed that individuals whose rights will be affected by magistrate
decisions "deserve the quality of federal justice that the tenure and compensation provisions of
Article III were intended to ensure." Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d
1037, 1052 (1984) (Posner, J., dissenting). This suggestion supports the observation that systemic due process should be the main focus of non-article III adjudication: non-article III
judicial decisions can upset the system's reliability when those decisions are relied upon subsequently as precedent. See supra note 99.
142. 824 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 741 (1987).
143. Id. at 1431.
144. Id. at 1438-39.
145. The Second Circuit, in United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1329, 1332-33 (2d Cir.
1988), did not agree with the Fordmajority's view of felony voir dire and sided with the Ninth
and First Circuits in holding that the reference to a magistrate of felony jury selection is both
allowed under the Magistrates Act and consistent with the Constitution. The Garcia court
believed the language of the Magistrates Act, which allowed the district courts to experiment
in assigning magistrates duties not necessarily included in the broad category of pretrial matters and to review de novo any unsustained challenges to jurors for cause, supported the reference of felony jury selection to a magistrate. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6162, 6172). In a more recent
case, United States v. Trice, 864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988), the Eighth Circuit agreed with the
Fifth Circuit and struck down a magistrate-conducted jury selection. The Trice court cited
Ford extensively and held that since jury selection is integral to trial, "Congress did not intend
to delegate to magistrates the authority to conduct voir dire under section 636(b) of the Magistrates Act." Id. at 1426.
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1982).
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magistrates. 14 7 Although magistrates may preside over felony misdemeanor jury trials with the consent of both parties, the Magistrates Act
never has been construed to allow magistrate jurisdiction over felony trials, nor has any district court attempted such a reference. 148 Because the
Ford majority believed that jury selection could not be separated from
trial as a mere preliminary or ministerial function, 14 9 the absence of authority forfelony trialreferences to magistrates also supported the denial
offelony voir dire references to magistrates. Beyond asserting an absence
of congressional intent, the Ford majority provided few arguments or
policy rationales against magistrates presiding over felony trials with defendant consent.
Magistrates may enter final judgments in any federal misdemeanor
trial and in any federal or diversity civil proceeding upon consent of the
parties. 5 0° Because the district court maintains control, these duties do
not trespass the boundaries of article III. The same rationales supporting
a magistrate's power to enter final judgments in civil and federal misdemeanor trials also should apply to the reference of federal felony trials to
magistrates. The exclusion of felony trials from magistrate jurisdiction
strongly suggests that fundamental fairness and its concerns for systemic
due process are the main policies behind a limit on the duties of magistrates.' 5 ' If individuals may waive rights to article III adjudication, and
147. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1435. But see In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennett
Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335, 1340-41 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979) ("The only
limitations on section 636(b)(3) are that the duties be consistent with the Constitution and
federal laws and that they not be specifically excluded by section 636(b)(1).").
148. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1435.
149. See id. The Ford court offered examples of the Supreme Court's concern for the
fairness of jury selection as evincing the process' importance and its role as an essential trial
component, unseverable from the trial itself:
The selection of a petit jury from a venire is an important part of trial.... Its tie to
trial is... illustrated by consistent judicial insistence upon its fairness as a component of trial. The Supreme Court has noted the "long and widely held belief that
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." [The Court also recently
has] attempted to free the selection process of racial-bias by prescribing a process [for
review of racially motivated] peremptory challenges.... Such concern plainly rejects
the view that jury selection is a preliminary and essentially ministerial act. At the
least it is an essential instrument to the delivery of a defendant's constitutionally
secured right to a jury trial rooted in the commands of due process, if not the trial
guarantees of the sixth amendment and section 2 of article III themselves.
Id. (citations omitted).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (Supp. 1987).
151. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. In arguing against a right to prose counsel in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 839 (1975), Chief Justice Burger observed that both
the prosecution and the defense attorney "are charged with the duty of insuring.., justice, in
the broadest sense of [the] term ....
That goal is ill-served, and the integrity of and public
confidence in the system are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due to the
defendant's ill-advised decision to waive counsel." See id. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(established constitutional principles require that justice be done to eliminate any injury to
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if the separation of powers is not seriously threatened by magistrates executing inherently judicial tasks, the Ford court's apprehension about
granting magistrates felony trial jurisdiction must stem from the notion
that potentially "inferior" jurists may upset the judicial system's
52
reliability.1
Prior to Ford, three federal circuits upheld the delegation of felony
jury selection to a magistrate. 153 These courts did not suggest, however,
that magistrates presiding over voir dire also may conduct felony trials.
Rather, as the Ford majority pointed out, these courts viewed "jury selection [as] sufficiently preliminary . ..to escape constitutional concerns
attending the assertion that [magistrates may preside] over the trial
54
itself."1
The Ford court held that, because of the importance of jury selection
as "an essential component of trial,"' 15 voir dire is not a pretrial matter
severable from the conduct of trial. Thus, the court reasoned that since
magistrates possess no jurisdiction over felony trials, a judge referring the
"inseverable" voir dire to a magistrate would be abdicating trial jurisdiction to the magistrate.' 56 The possibility of complete abdication is
society associated with unfair judgments); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (if
the constitutional safeguards provided by counsel are lost, justice will not be done).
152. Although the Ford court did not state directly that the magistrate's voir dire presidence was inadequate, its factual summary was somewhat disparaging:
A United States Magistrate presided over the selection of the jury, which took some
four hours despite the routine nature of the charges. The magistrate first summarized
the indictment for the venire, introduced all counsel, and then personally interrogated each member of the venire. He gave a substantially complete jury charge....
[and explained] the nature of circumstantial evidence including a metaphorabout wet
grass ....
Ford, 824 F.2d at 1431 (emphasis added).
Other examples of potentially inadequate magistrate voir dire are cited in United States v.
Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 1985), in which "the magistrate improperly commented to the jury that they should not believe what the lawyers say," and "that the lawyers
were close friends and in a hurry to get finished"; United States v. De la Torre, 605 F.2d 154,
156 (5th Cir. 1979), in which a magistrate, upon receipt of the jury's verdict, committed reversible error by refusing "the defendant's request to have certain instructions re-read to the
jury." The Bezold court found that such error was not reversible because the district court
judge "was able to make a careful curative instruction to the jury as to the proper role of
lawyers and their statements in the course of trial." 760 U.S. at 1002-03. If these cases evidence the potential problems with magistrates and felony juries, they do not explain how an
article III judge would be less likely to make the same errors.
153. United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 764-65
(2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 874 (1st Cir. 1983).
154. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1435; cf United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1329, 1332-33
(1988) ("even assuming arguendo that jury selection falls on the 'trial' side of the line between
'trial' and 'pretrial'-a line that is, at best, often blurred-the legislative history of § 636(b)
does not preclude delegation of that task to a magistrate").
155. 824 F.2d at 1435, 1438.
156. Id. at 1434-35.
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heightened by the "difficulties of review by an article III judge of a magistrate's rulings in jury selection."' 5 7 Such a practice, the Ford court
contended, violates congressional intent regarding the extent of permissible magistrate references mentioned in the Act and poses "grave constitutional issues." 158 The Ford court also cited the "absence of a statutory
procedure" for review of a magistrate's presiding over voir dire. 159 More
specifically, the Ford majority believed that review of a controversial
venireperson's responses to voir dire would be impossible from a cold
transcript.16°
Despite the Ford majority's strong arguments against magistrateconducted voir dire, the court upheld Ms. Ford's conviction because she
did not object to magistrate voir dire and because the trial was "fundamentally fair."' 61 Although the Ford court proclaimed that the reference
of felony voir dire to a magistrate poses "grave constitutional issues," it
allowed the reference in Ms. Ford's case because she constructively consented. This result supports the proposition that litigant consent may be
a panacea for constitutional infirmities involving article III, but also suggests that only those magistrate jury selections that require a de novo
review by the district judge violate the Federal Magistrates Act and article III.
Yet if the de novo review maintains the district judge's judicial
power, jury selection by a magistrate that does not invite objection or
require de novo review places the judicial power with the magistrate.
The problem created by the suggestion that only challenged magistrate
voir dire is unconstitutional and that consent will remedy any constitu157. Id at 1435. The Ford dissent vigorously maintained that the majority misinterpreted
the "other duties" clause of the Act. The dissent cited Congress' intention that district courts
"freely] experiment" in "innovative and imaginative" efforts "to clean up their caseload backlog." Id at 1441 (Rubin, J.,dissenting) (quoting Hearings on the FederalMagistratesAct
Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1968)
(testimony of Sen. Joseph Tydings)); see also H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6162, 6172).

158. 824 F.2d at 1435. The majority did not elaborate on the potentially "grave constitutional issues," merely footnoting existing authority challenging magistrate constitutionality in
other contexts. Id at 1435 n.30.
159. Id at 1435.
160. Id at 1437. In support of this belief, the court stated:
"The manner of the juror while testifying is often times more indicative of the real
character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be
spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not
to reverse the ruling below upon such a question of fact, except in a clear case."
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1879)). This belief resembles
Justice Marshall's due process contention in Raddatz. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
161. 824 F.2d at 1438-39.
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tional infirmity, however, was avoided by the Fifth162Circuit's order that
district judges merely conduct their own voir dire.
Although the Ford majority found no error with Ms. Ford's magistrate-conducted voir dire, it still maintained that consent was not a cure
for improper, magistrate-conducted felony voir dire. 163 Because the
court stated that an individual may not waive the right to jury selection
by an article III judge, the Ford court implied that magistrate adjudication affects institutional due process concerns beyond the individual due
process satisfied by consent and waiver.
Ford and other federal circuit decisions discussing magistrate voir
dire' 64 evince two potentially contradictory rationales. In Ford, the defendant's failure to object to a magistrate's presidence at voir dire created
constructive consent. This suggests that an individual's right to an article III judge remains the primary focus of the magistrate controversy.
Other federal appellate decisions, however, have held that even if the
defendant does not consent (or objects) to a magistrate-conducted jury
selection process, voir dire remains a pretrial matter, and the reserved
standards of district court review remedy any potential denial of the defendant's right to an article III jury selection process. 65 Despite this
66
controversy, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in Ford.1
The Ford opinion suggests that in certain trials the district judge
must preside over voir dire to ensure fundamental fairness and rejects the
possibility that consent could remedy unfairness. The Ford majority thus
implies that selection of certain juries requires the superior expertise of
an article III judge and that the de novo review standard presents serious
practical problems as a safeguard against magistrate errors in voir
162. "Trusting that district judges will abide this decision, we have no occasion to exercise
our supervisory jurisdiction to prevent the repetition [of magistrate conducted voir dire]." Id
at 1439 n.60.
163.

The Ford court refused to hold that consent could remedy constitutional infirmities

and avoid error, however: "Our conclusion that this trial was not fundamentally unfair despite
the error is not a suggestion that, with consent of the parties, there is no error." Id.
164. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.

165. See United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding magistrate felony voir dire based upon defendant's failure to object); United States v. Rivera-Sola,
713 F.2d 866, 874 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); see also United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1003
(9th Cir. 1985) (upholding referral of felony voir dire to magistrate, despite defendant's
objection).
166. 108 S. Ct. 741 (1988). Justice White issued a dissent to the denial of certiorari and
asserted :
If the [Ford] decision is incorrect, and this use of the magistrate violates either the
[Magistrates] Act or the Constitution, then it is not obvious that this violation can be
dismissed under the "plain error" doctrine. And the position of the Fifth Circuit on

this issue conflicts with two decisions of the Ninth Circuit ....
Circuits on this issue warrants our granting certiorari.

The split among the

Id. at 742 (White, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1317-19 (9th

Cir. 1985); Bezold, 760 F.2d at 1001-03).
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dire. 167 If defendant consent does not ensure the Ford notion of fundamental fairness, then the fairness requirement must be a concern for the
judicial system's reliability, 168 rather than for the defendant's individual
right to due process.
B. A New Constitutional Rationale
Article III's provision for the separation of powers, with an independent judiciary, and strict judicial function rationales are no longer
functional in assessing the constitutionality of an expanded role for judicial adjuncts. Courts have diluted the above requirements in a balancing
approach to article III questions, and litigant consent has emerged as the
primary determinant of the acceptability of non-article III tribunals and
judicial officers. This suggests that fundamental fairness provides a
much clearer explanation for recent decisions in this area.
Fundamental fairness, albeit unstated, consistently has entered into
the article III analysis of a litigant's right to article III determination.
Fundamental fairness-that is, the judicial system's overall reliabilityhowever, has not been mentioned in the debate over expanded non-article
III adjudication in general, and federal magistrate adjudication
specifically.
The federal court system's fundamental fairness concern in regard
to the exercise of the judicial function by magistrates suggests that the
magistrate may be regarded as inferior to article III judges and intimates
that judicial determinations by district court adjuncts may be less reliable. No court or commentator has ever questioned the integrity or reliability of magistrate jurisdiction directly, however. Instead, courts have
focused upon the requirements of article III as the indicators of the acceptability of non-article adjudication.
Under the fundamental fairness analysis, the language of article III
no longer provides an adequate gauge for determining when the judicial
function has been abdicated to individuals "unfit" for federal judicial
decisionmaking. Certainly providing life tenure and an irreducible salary
cannot ensure a more competent jurist and more reliable judicial determinations. If no evidence exists to prove that magistrate decisions are
less reliable and less fundamentally fair than matters handled by article
III judges in the district court, the fundamental fairness rationale introduced here would promote unlimited jurisdiction for magistrates with
litigant consent. Such a contention would challenge the entire federal
court structure.
This Note, however, does not advocate such an extreme position.
The fundamental fairness of magistrate adjudication is secured by the
167. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1437.
168. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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very "safeguards" that maintain adjunct constitutionality under the
traditional article III analysis. The provisions for district court control
and review of magistrate decisionmaking, along with the requirements
for appointing magistrates and provisions for removing them, 169 assure
the fundamental fairness and systemic reliability of magistrate
adjudication.
Conclusion
The article III rationales traditionally invoked to protect the constitutional structure and the independence of the judiciary are no longer
adequate to determine the acceptability of increased judicial powers
granted federal magistrates. Rather, when the effectiveness of expedited
adjunct jurisdiction is balanced against a litigant's right to an independent judiciary, fundamental fairness emerges as the proper approach to
determining the constitutionality of magistrate adjudication.
The very safeguards that justify increased magistrate functions
under the article III analysis also ensure fundamental fairness because
they ensure that litigants consenting to a magistrate's jurisdiction receive
the same "quality" of decisionmaking and structural safeguards provided
by article III judges. Decisions by magistrates operating within the
structure of the district court, with the provided procedural and appellate safeguards, are as reliable as the decisions of the district court's article III judges.

169.

28 U.S.C. § 631(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987); id. § 631(i).

